In defence of atheists.

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Permalink Reply by Steve Bray on July 8, 2009 at 1:29pm

Agreed Caral, and the best way to communicate the benefits and sheer joy of His Spirit is to get close to non-believers, let them get a teensy bit 'jealous' of what we have received and to genarelly act like a carrier from whom the 'bug' can be caught....I think that's where I am wiith this one just now...but watch out for the wreckers and agents provoceteurs!

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Permalink Reply by James Croft on July 8, 2009 at 6:05pm

What I think it interesting about this post, although I welcome the sentiment, is that it proceeds from a category error. Atheism is not a "world-view", and much confusion arises due to this mistake.

Think of it this way: what view of the world does not believing in a deity commit you to? It doesn't commit you to any particular moral framework or political ideology. Nor does it constrain you to any particular view of "spiritual" experience. It is similar in this way to "A-unicornism" - the belief that there are no unicorns. This belief (which I presume all posters here hold) does not commit you to any "world-view", nor does it constitute one in itself.

Therefore, to talk as if atheism was a belief-system which requires "justification" is to be mistaken about the nature of the constructs under discussion. The burden of justification is on those who believe in unicorns, not those who don't.

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Permalink Reply by Richard Morgan on July 8, 2009 at 6:39pm

James Croft: "it proceeds from a category error. Atheism is not a "world-view"
James - thank you so much for your comment - I understand your point entirely. When I was an atheist I got heavily involved with discussions on this subject (you are surely aware of Sam Harris's thoughts, amongst others, on the subject.)
In a world where tobacco didn't exist, the expression "non-smoker" would make no sense, of course. In the real world, it does have a sense.

Now, since every individual with a functioning brain does have a world view, the fact that one has a god-free world view necessarily affects that world view.

You say It doesn't commit you to any particular moral framework or political ideology. and elsewhere "This (Christianity in the USA) has further "radicalised" me toward a more muscular Secular Humanism."
.. so I suppose there is at least an over-lap somewhere.
(Of course, your reaction is perfectly understandable. I live in France where, as general rule, religion is just not an issue.)

It has been suggested that "atheism" is the default belief structure in the human being, but this has not been proven. Maybe it is.

I agree that "atheism" in its simplest sense does not require justification. But the affirmation "there are no gods" becomes positively axiomatic when confronted with theism. ( I know that for sure because a unicorn told me - so there!)
Insmuch as a belief in God or gods is a universal cross-cultural constant, and insamuch as evolutionary theories (and all the associated disciplines) have so far failed to provide an adequate explanation*, we are entitled to allow ourselves something which looks like a "category error".


* There is a tentative explanation which I take a humorous look at here. Please don't take it seriously.

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Permalink Reply by James Croft on July 8, 2009 at 6:53pm

Thank you for the reply. I think you won't be surprised that I am not convinced about the need for the error. I think your analogy with tobacco highlights the problem. In that case, neither is a world-view: "being a smoker" is not one, and "not being a smoker" is not one.

On the other hand, "being a Christian" is a wold-view (it commits you at least minimally to certain precepts), while "being an atheist" is not a world view (it commits you to no belief system whatsoever).

I agree that "every individual with a functioning brain does have a world view", and that "the fact that one has a god-free world view necessarily affects that world view", but I do not accept that "atheism" constitutes a world view which requires justification.

The fact that belief in god or gods is a cultural constant (as far as I know this is correct) only puts the burden of proof on the atheist if they are attempting to argue that belief in god or gods does not exist - if they are, if you will, an "a-theistic-belief-ist". But that is not the position of the atheist. The position of the atheist is that insufficient evidence has been provided in support of the god hypothesis, and thus there is insufficient reason to reject the null-hypothesis - that there is no such thing.

The burden of justification is still on the other side.

Oh, I should say I enjoyed your link - it was indeed humorous.

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Permalink Reply by Richard Morgan on July 8, 2009 at 7:33pm

James : "a-theistic-belief-ist" et seq.
An excellent point!
And this, I feel, takes us beyond the boundaries of the arena of the purely intellectual, rational debate/ exchange of ideas.
("Life" is more than just a bundle of genetic programmes - you'll often hear me talking in this vein.)
It invites us to look very closely at the nature of belief structures (Sam Harris has done some interesting research in this direction) and the rôle they play in determiining the quality of my life.
Don't worry, I'm not so naïve as to start claiming that because believing makes me "happy" - therefore God exists.
I'm not even going to provide links that claim to demonstrate that theistic beliefs are good for your cholesterol levels and/or your bank account!

My position does owe much to the idea of Blaise Pascal :"Il y a dans le cœur de chaque homme, un creux à la forme de Dieu." ("There is a God-shaped hole in the heart of every human being" - that's my PC translation)

More later.

Keep posting!

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Permalink Reply by James Croft on July 8, 2009 at 7:44pm

This is interesting, although I'm not sure where it leads. Potentially, you could argue from this perspective that, regardless of whether belief in Christianity (say) reflects accurately how the world actually is, we should believe it nonetheless due to the benefits it provides human societies and the quality it gives our phenomenological experience.

I actually think this is a reasonable position to hold, as long as two caveats are strictly observed: first, it is explicitly recognised and stated that one is believing regardless of the evidence, and that therefore no one else is required to give credence to the opinion on rational grounds. Second, it rather restricts the right of one to proselytize - you can suggest to someone that they would be better off believing X, but you could not logically or morally require them to believe it, or threaten them with supernatural punishment should they choose not to.

This would not, of course, be religion any longer, but a sort of psychological crutch, recognized as such, used in order to improve the quality of experience. Further, I suggest that one can recreate the psychologically pleasing aspects of religious experience through entirely secular means - but that's another discussion.

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Permalink Reply by Richard Morgan on July 8, 2009 at 8:00pm

James - you raise some interesting and vital points!
Let me question you about just one of these points, because I feel it could be crucial (though far from new...):
one is believing regardless of the evidence
Firstly, what kind(s) of evidence are we talking about here?
Secondly, to what extent are belief structures evidence-based?
Thirdly, what is the rôle of the mental phenomenon that we call "belief" - as opposed to simple cognition or "knowledge"?
(Yes, I know, I know, I apologise - saying "simple cognition" is a contradiction in itself, but I hope it will suffice for this discussion. please correct me if you feel I'm over....er, simplifying.)

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Permalink Reply by James Croft on July 8, 2009 at 8:35pm

Yes, these are great questions.

The question about the nature of evidence is a particularly difficult one, but I'll give it a go. I'm currently working a little in the area of interdisciplinary epistemology, meaning "how do we come to understand things in the different intellectual disciplines?" and "what happens when these disciplines collide?"

Through this work it is clear that different intellectual disciplines have different epistemological structures, and that what would count as "evidence" in one structure would not in another. For example, what counts as historical evidence would not necessarily serve as literary evidence or scientific evidence. Standards of proof are different, as are ways of using evidence, however defined, to come to reasonable understandings. Thus evidence can take many forms. Common to all disciplines, however, is the requirement that any evidence presented, in whatever form, must be open to scrutiny by anyone with the requisite ability to do so fairly, and that questions that arise regarding the legitimacy of particular forms of evidence are taken seriously. Thus, no evidence presented can come purely from the phenomonology of a single party, as it is inaccessible to scrutiny by others (this is just one example).

What all the disciplines also share is a commitment to some form of evidence or reasoning structure. In effect this simply means that they do not accept bare assertions as reasonable ways to get at a justified understanding. It seems to me that he sort of "religious belief" I was talking about there would revolve around convincing oneself of a bare assertion: "Believing that god exists is good for me, so I will decide to believe that god exists, regardless of whether I have good grounds for thinking so." The reason why evidence flees there is because the reason for the decision to hold the belief is explicitly not to do with the grounds for the belief itself, but to do with its supposed beneficial effects. Thus, belief without evidence or, at the very least, belief regardless of whether evidence exists, belief that exists independent of evidential or reasoned basis.

Second question - it depends on what you want to call a belief structure, and on what type of belief structure you are referring to. But one example might serve to put my position on this sort of question up for debate, at least. If you look at young children's understanding of a concept like "the earth is round", you find that they often have very inadequate conceptions of what this means - they tend to believe that the world is "round" in that it has hills, but is still essentially a flat surface, for example. This is a false belief, but it is still based on evidence - the child has a reason for believing it that is compelling to them. Helping them toward more accurate beliefs is not just a matter of adding more information to their model, but a matter of helping them perceive the inadequacies of their current model - their evidence might be flawed, for example, or incomplete.

Final question: I don't want to make a distinction between "belief" and "simple cognition". Rather I'd like to put it this way. Beliefs are simply those statements we think to be true. Knowledge is generally construed as "justified true belief" - beliefs that are concordant with the real world and for which we have adequate justification. However, it has been realized by some philosophers (whom I respect) that justified true belief is essentially impossible to attain outside of formal logic. Therefore I would argue the need to work towards better "understanding" of the world, rather than an increase in our "knowledge". What counts as "understanding" is monstrously difficult to say =D

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Permalink Reply by Richard Morgan on July 8, 2009 at 9:00pm

James - brilliant post.
Thank you.
(Just as an aside, it seems like you're forgetting that I did say:
Don't worry, I'm not so naïve as to start claiming that because believing makes me "happy" - therefore God exists.
I'm not even going to provide links that claim to demonstrate that theistic beliefs are good for your cholesterol levels and/or your bank account! But, never mind. I've been a married man for 35 years, I'm used to being ignored. )

must be open to scrutiny by anyone with the requisite ability to do so fairly,
Ouch - that's a thorny one. But which perhaps brings us closer to the core of this discussion. What are the criteria for defining "requisite ability"?
Let's take for example the roundness of the earth.
I happen to believe that the earth is not flat, because I believe the authority of those who can prove the flattened- orangeness of the earth's shape, and because every time I go to Brazil I don't fall over the edge.
So I no longer believe my own eyes when I see the sun rising in the East and setting in the West.
But as far as our perceptions are concerned, we are increasingly discovering that in many cases, "I see what I believe" has more truth that "I believe what I see."
And I'm not just talking about a superficial level of gullible belief. I'm talking about concrete (?) brain functions. People from vastly different cultures perceive different things when confronted with the same objects or situations.
Where would we place "requisite ability" in that context.
(If I seem to be labouring a minor point, please bear with me, I think it will be useful.)
Without forgetting the impact of the "observer" upon the "observed".
Things are not as clear-cut as we might wish them to be.


More later.

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Permalink Reply by James Croft on July 8, 2009 at 9:25pm

It wasn't my intention to ignore your earlier disclaimer - I was not aware that anything I had written claimed or suggested that you hadn't said this. My point was referring back to my own extrapolation of the little kernel you offered, not back to the original statements you made on the matter. Further, I was unaware that I was presenting a "clear-cut" response. Rather, if anything, it is complex and contextual!

Nonetheless:

"as far as our perceptions are concerned, we are increasingly discovering that in many cases, "I see what I believe" has more truth that "I believe what I see."

This is absolutely true, and well evidenced by numerous psychological studies, many of which you can try out at home. Neuroscience adds little to this understanding, frankly - it's very solid without it.

However, I'm not certain this has much bearing on the argument I presented. Let's look again at the example you offered:

I happen to believe that the earth is not flat, because I believe the authority of those who can prove the flattened- orangeness of the earth's shape, and because every time I go to Brazil I don't fall over the edge.
So I no longer believe my own eyes when I see the sun rising in the East and setting in the West.

In this case your current belief about the nature of the world is based on two sources: authority (whose authority is in fact based on their ability to "prove" it, as you say), and empirical evidence you yourself collect. In effect your argument is that "since individuals who are to be trusted more than I on this subject have collected and analyzed evidence on this point, and because I encounter evidence to support their opinion, and because nothing I encounter causes me to doubt this accumulated evidence sufficiently, I therefore accept the proposition that the world is not flat, but round-ish."

Let's analyze the next bit:

"So I no longer believe my own eyes when I see the sun rising in the East and setting in the West."

Here you are suggesting that you encounter a discrepancy between the "proofs" offered by the experts, your own experience in travelling to Brazil, and your experience of watching the Sun "move" across the sky. This could legitimately be an extremely challenging cognitive disruption: you have evidence pointing to two different conclusions! But this is the crucial point here: the evidence of your eyes, as you watch the sun, is still entirely consistent with the theory of a round earth, properly understood. Thus by taking on that cognitive frame, you can house all the evidence (the authorities, the trips to Brazil sans precipitatory events, and the sun's path across the sky). Properly conceived, then, you are not required to "disbelieve" your own eyes - merely to understand what they are telling you.

How does this help answer your question about the "credentials" of the scrutineers? Well, as with many areas of complexity, it will ultimately be a judgment call over which people may legitimately disagree - there are no superordinate rules, from my perspective, as to what counts as "requisite ability", and the criteria are changing all the time. A renowned physicist of the 60's, for example, now in her dotage, may not be considered any longer a legitimate critic of current research in the same field - it has changed significantly since then!

But our earth example furnishes some useful hints. It suggests that, when you were analyzing the evidence about the flatness or otherwise of the globe, you were swayed by authorities due to the strength of their proofs. Further, we have seen how a "better" understanding of a phenomena incorporates more observed evidence (the sun "moving" across the sky) than a worse one. Therefore you might say that the most qualified scrutineers are those whose proofs are sounds and are able to incorporate into an understanding-framework more of the observed evidence than their peers - without postulating unnecessary additional factors.

But that's just a first stab - this is fun, Richard!

Permalink Reply by Richard Morgan on July 9, 2009 at 11:14am

James : "without postulating unnecessary additional factors.
But that's just a first stab..."
Ouch! Stop stabbing me with your Occam's razor. Didn't your mother teach you that that can be dangerous????
I agree with just about everything you say (and since you're an atheist, this is not doing my digestive system any good at all!) but I need to move the debate on to a rather more delicate stage.
Would you agree to accept ideas concerning:
"the observer observed",
the differences between, and relative values of, the "container" and the "contained",
notions (I'm going to say this very quietly) of qualia,
and my all-time favourite: "The whole is greater than the sum of the parts"?
I would sincerely appreciate your ideas on those questions before developing them, firstly in order to avoid our talking at cross purposes and secondly, I'm sure your remarks will help me to further clarify my own thinking.
When you have replied, and we have established a common ground, I will publish my reply to your last post, turning my attention to:
"However, I'm not certain this has much bearing on the argument I presented."
There! You weren't expecting that, were you? ;-)

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Permalink Reply by James Croft on July 9, 2009 at 3:51pm

OK. This is very difficult indeed, not only because the concepts you raise are difficult, but because it is a huge challenge to respond to them in the round without knowing to which purpose they are going to be used. Nonetheless, it seems to me that we might be heading towards a discussion of human consciousness, so I'll try to reply on those grounds.

First, let me say I agree with Richard Dawkins when he says that human consciousness is the most fascinating and difficult of phenomena for which we are yet to devise a convincing explanation. I also tend to agree with what I believe is also his position - that one of two outcomes of our investigations into the topic is likely: we will find a naturalistic explanation, or we will be unable to find a satisfactory naturalistic explanation, but not find evidence to convince us of the need for a supernatural explanation.

Having said this, I think the best bet for our naturalistic explanation (and this is just a personal hunch) is something along the lines of Hofstadter/Dennet's work in the area to do with emergence from reflexive processes and "strange loops". But I have no real idea if it is actually true.

As for qualia, I share most of Dennet's concerns about the usefulness of such a confused term, but I don't think the concept has been demonstrated to be totally null and void.

For "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts", I can't help remembering that wonderful rephrase (again Hofstadter), "The soul is greater than the hum of its parts". He is referring to what he sees to be the emergent property of "souls", and by implication drawing them into the natural order, as many systems (even artificially created ones) display remarkable emergent properties.

In short, whether I accept the sorts of ideas you ask about is essentially going to depend on how they are used. I have no idea if this helps or if I'm barking up entirely the wrong tree!

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